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INTRODUCTION
Having addressed in a previous paper (Krabbe, 2006) some of the predicaments that can
arise in the first, opening stage of a pragma-dialectical critical discussion, in this paper
Professor Krabbe turns his attention to problems associated with the final, concluding
stage. Roughly, Krabbe identifies three main problem areas for the concluding stage of a
critical discussion, which I will call: (i) getting in, (ii) getting on, and (iii) getting out.
In the pragma-dialectical system, the concluding stage seems to be a relatively
uncomplicated affair in which only one type of move – retraction – occurs, and which is
(uniquely) governed by only one rule (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, p. 154):
Rules of the concluding stage: Rule 14
a. The protagonist is obliged to retract the initial standpoint if the antagonist has
conclusively attached it (in the manner prescribed in rule 9) in the argumentation stage
(and has also observed the other discussion rules).
b. The antagonist is obliged to retract the calling into question of the initial standpoint if the
protagonist has conclusively defended it (in the manner prescribed in rule 9) in the
argumentation stage (and has also observed the other discussion rules).
c. In all other cases, the protagonist is not obliged to retract the initial standpoint, nor is
the antagonist obliged to withdraw his calling into question the initial standpoint.

If Krabbe’s argument is correct then, on the assumptions that (i) every discussant has had
his or her say, and that (ii) conclusiveness is understood not in an absolute sense but
relative to the intersubjective standards of the particular argumentative discussion, 1
condition 14(c) ought never to apply. Thus, the pragma-dialectical system would provide
a procedural method by which every externalized difference of opinion may be
conclusively resolved – though may always be reopened if, for example, new occasions 2
to doubt the standpoint at issue come to light.
I now turn to each of the three problems areas that Krabbe addresses, and provide
some comments on the solutions Krabbe offers in each of these areas.
1

On this point, I agree with Krabbe (p. 4) that the right way to understand conclusive attacks and defenses
is not in an absolute sense, “but in a sense relative to a particular discussion with particular discussion rules,
adopted procedures and agreed common starting points.”
2
The term “occasion” here is used in quite a lose sense, and is meant to include not only situations where
relevant information comes to light (or to mind), but also situations where new participants take up a
position on the standpoint.
Godden, D.M. (2007). Commentary on Erik C.W. Krabbe’s “Predicaments of the concluding stage.” In
H.V. Hansen, et. al. (Eds.), Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground, CD-ROM (pp. 1-5).
Windsor, ON: OSSA.
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GETTING IN
The problem of getting in to the concluding stage involves determining when, or under
what conditions it is proper to enter the concluding stage. According to Krabbe:
The task for the theoretician, then, is to find a set of dialectic rules that prevent indefinite and
senseless dilation of the argumentation stage, without giving either discussant the power to curb
the other’s fundamental rights to bring forward arguments or criticisms.

I agree with Krabbe that ending the process of argumentation and entering the concluding
phase cannot be accomplished by a speech act. Just as settling who is to be the
protagonist – and therefore who will bear the burden of proof in the argumentative
process – cannot be settled by a “Tag; you’re it.” manoeuvre – at least not in any
rationally or argumentatively satisfying way – nor can a similar move bring
argumentation to a close, even if it is followed up with, or made more sophisticated by, a
“No toutchbacks! No backsies!” move. Rather, the settling of these kinds of issues should
be determined by the rules governing the argumentative process, or by principles of
rationality, logic or evidence which may ultimately form the theoretical bases of the
procedural rules. 3
Initially, Krabbe suggests a solution where “each discussant may open a
concluding stage, but will have to pay a fine if the concluding stage does not lead to a
resolution of the difference of opinion.” Yet, if Krabbe is correct, the only way that a
difference of opinion could fail to be resolved through a critical discussion would be if
either party has not yet fully had his say. So, in the end, Krabbe proposes a solution
where participants decide themselves, through mutual agreement, to enter the concluding
stage. Proposals to enter the concluding stage can be made by either party at any point in
the discussion, but if the offer is declined then the proposer must pay a small fine.
A problem with this solution seems to be this: It will generally be in the interest of
a discussant who thinks that she has lost a critical discussion (by failing to produce a
conclusive attack or defense), to forestall any movement into the concluding stage. Thus,
given the option to decline going to the concluding stage, the prospective ‘loser’ could
simply filibuster the argumentative process by continually declining any proposal to
enter. This motivation might lead to a type of strategic manoeuvring by which the ‘loser’
attempts to filibuster the argumentative process by continually refusing to move to the
concluding stage. Clearly, such a discussion move threatens the resolution of a critical
discussion – and is thereby fallacious (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1987) – but so far
it is not clear that it violates any of the rules of a critical discussion.
At the very least, then, it would seem that discussants who decline a proposal to
move to the concluding stage must ‘move towards having the rest of their say’ in
subsequent discussion moves. 4 This might involve expressing new or unresolved doubts,
3

For example, consider the old adage “He who asserts must prove,” which acts as a principle in
determining which party will bear the burden of proof. In this case, it looks like the problem is adequately
settled by Rule 3 – the obligation to defend – of the Pragma-Dialectical code of conduct for a critical
discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 139).
4
Here it might be noted that arguers proposing to move to the concluding stage are, on Krabbe’s account,
implicitly committed to the claim that each participant has fully had her say. Thus, by moving towards
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bringing new information to bear on the existing argumentation or standpoint at issue, or
observing (at least one of) those points of the argumentation which have already occurred
but which have not been properly settled according to one of the available intersubjective
procedures (e.g., identification, inference or testing). 5 Failing this, perhaps arguers
refusing to move to the concluding stage ought to (i) have to pay a small fine, and
perhaps even (ii) be compelled to move to the concluding stage on the grounds that they
have had every fair chance to have their say.
Yet in regard to (ii) I would like to express some further concerns. An arguer’s
reluctance to move to the concluding stage even though she cannot move the
argumentative discussion forward in any substantive way (i.e., even though it appears that
she has had every opportunity to ‘have her say’) need not be the result of a fallacious
attempt to filibuster the argumentative process. An arguer may (even justifiably) feel that
a standpoint has not been conclusively defended even though she cannot launch a
conclusive attack against it. For example, she may believe that someone else – perhaps
someone who is either more knowledgeable about the topics under discussion or a better
arguer than she, would be able to provide a conclusive attack of the standpoint even
though she cannot. Here it seems to me that an arguer’s reluctance to move to the
concluding stage, thereby conceding a standpoint about which she still harbors doubts, is
justifiable even though she may have nothing more to say in the argumentative discussion
given her present knowledge state.
To me this presents an additional problem for getting into the concluding stage of
argumentation which needs to be resolved.
GETTING ON
The problem of getting on is, roughly, what to do once one is in the concluding stage:
what occurs there and how is it to be conducted? Krabbe writes that:
The predicament here is that, in order to establish the yield of their discussion, they must either
take the results of the argumentation stage for granted or make an assessment of the results of the
argumentation stage. In the first case, the whole concluding stage would be nugatory, since
everything has been established in the argumentation stage, whereas in the second case the attempt
to assess the results of the argumentation will involve the use of arguments and hence catapult the
discussants back into the same or another argumentation stage.

Krabbe’s (p.3) 4-step procedure for conducting the concluding stage seems to indicate
that he takes the concluding stage to involve making an assessment of the results of the
argumentation stage using the intersubjective evaluation procedures agreed to in the
opening stage. 6
having the rest of her say in subsequent discussion moves, an arguer shows this commitment to be false,
and the proposal to be premature.
5
In this commentary, I will refer to the entire collection of such procedures as “intersubjective evaluation
procedures.”
6
The following concern really constitutes an extended digression, not directly related to Krabbe’s main
point. Yet, to my mind it also presents an important problem affecting the ideal outcomes of argumentation
and the overall acceptability of an arguer’s position considered in its entirety. I include it therefore as an
extended footnote.
The problem of retracting starting points, fixed points and intersubjective evaluation procedures:
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I agree with Krabbe’s initial view that including assessment in the concluding
stage involves a return to argumentation proper – even if this assessment is conceived of
as a meta-dialogue.
As I understand it, the purpose of the concluding stage seems to be quite singular:
the evocation of a speech act of retraction either on the part of the proponent (retracting
her initial standpoint) or on the part of the respondent (retracting his initially expressed
doubt about the standpoint). This speech act of retraction brings about a state of
agreement between the parties to the argumentation (characterized by a consistency of
their mutual commitments) with respect to the standpoint at issue.
Further, the initial difference of opinion is said to be resolved because these
speech acts of retraction occur in accordance with – indeed result from – the parties
following the rules of the critical discussion. Speech acts evoked in the concluding stage
are the direct result of obligations participants incur in the argumentation stage. It is
because of this that differences of opinion are actually resolved (in accordance with rules
normatively sanctioning the result) rather than just settled by agreement or on some other
basis.
Further still, it is because the rule(s) governing the concluding stage, and creating
the obligations to retract, are directly linked to rules governing speech acts in
argumentation stage that the results of argumentation (e.g., the retraction and subsequent
state of agreement) can be said to be based on the argumentative process itself.
Finally, it is because the speech acts evoked in the concluding stage are the direct
results of obligations that participants incur in the argumentative stage that the resolution
of the difference of opinion actually is achieved (or occurs) in the argumentation stage.
What happens in the concluding stage, it seems to me, is that this resolution is
externalized – it is explicitly recognized, or ratified, by the participants to the
argumentative process.
So, on my reading, the concluding stage is short and sweet. It does not involve
either an evaluation of arguments put forward in the argumentation stage, nor does it
revisit the evaluations of argumentation put forward in the argumentation stage. Yet, nor
is it nugatory. Rather it externalizes the results of argumentation (i.e., the resolution of a
difference of opinion) which has been achieved in the process of argumentation.
Krabbe notes that, in a critical discussion, the acceptability of a standpoint will ultimately be determined
according to the shared commitments and intersubjective evaluation procedures agreed to in the opening
stage of argumentation. As I understand the pragma-dialectical system, commitment to things agreed to in
the opening stage of argumentation is not retractable over the course of a critical discussion. I think that this
restriction is mistaken. Previously (Godden 2008), I have argued that the acceptability of a claim is
determined by how well it survives the process of argumentation, not where it stands at the beginning. Our
fallible nature as rational and epistemic agents would seem to indicate that starting points which lead to
unexpected or undesired results should be re-examined and perhaps abandoned. This applies not only to
claims in an initial commitment set which subsequently seem to contradict new information , but also
evaluation procedures endorsed in an opening stage which later seem to produce unreliable results. For
example, suppose that a source initially endorsed as reliable and authoritative is either (a) subsequently
shown to be unreliable or (b) begins reporting information that is either (bi) inconsistent with information
reported by other presumptively reliable and authoritative sources, or (bii) is inconsistent with some of our
other, well-entrenched commitments. Failure to permit retraction to these initial commitments could
jeopardize the results of argumentation, if participants feel that the evaluation procedures they initially
endorsed are beginning to produce unacceptable results to which they nevertheless remain bound by the
rules of the argumentative process.
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Thus, while Krabbe portrays the concluding stage as the ‘drinks and tidbits’ stage
of argumentation, I think that the ‘drinks and tidbits’ are properly reserved for the
subsequent gathering on the backyard patio. The concluding stage, I think, is more
correctly understood as the ‘signing-of-the-paperwork’ phase of a critical discussion,
where the results of the argumentative process are ratified by the participants. 7
GETTING OUT
If I am correct in my view that the concluding stage is a ‘signing-of-the-paperwork’
phase of argumentation whereby the results of the argumentative process are ratified by
its participants, then getting out of the concluding phase seems to be a relatively simple
process. Once the paperwork is signed, participants are free to move on to the drinks and
refreshments. Any reluctance to sign the paperwork properly belongs to the
argumentation stage.
From my point of view, though, the more interesting question here is not how one
gets out of the concluding stage, but rather what one’s obligations are having left the
concluding stage. Are the commitments that one undertakes in the argumentative process,
and ratifies in the concluding stage, binding on the participant after the critical discussion
is concluded? After all, the source of the commitments and obligations incurred in the
process of argumentation are the rules constituting and governing the argumentative
discussion itself. Yet, if these rules only apply to (i.e., during) the critical discussion
itself, then it is not at all apparent – at least not to me – that they are binding on arguers
beyond the critical discussion. Yet if arguers are not somehow bound by the results of
argumentation beyond the argumentative process itself, then what is the social value of
argumentation as a process for managing disagreement? On the other hand, if arguers
should remain bound by the commitments and obligations which they undertake in the
process of argumentation, then what additional standing or justification (if any) do the
rules of a critical discussion require in order to properly apply beyond the conclusion of
the argumentative process itself?
link to paper

link to response
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This makes the getting out phase even more important, because, of course, we would all like to move on
to the drinks and refreshments. Indeed, perhaps explicitly adding a drinks and refreshments stage might
help to expedite the argumentative process and to bring about the resolution of a critical discussion, by
giving participants an added incentive to finish.
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